Information on the Battlefield: The Battle of Little Bighorn

Let's take a new look at the Battle of Little Bighorn, but from the vantage point of a prospective Intelligence Officer, had there been such a thing at the time. For practical purposes, the functions of Operations and Intelligence were combined under the Commander of the 7th Cavalry, LTC Custer. So this is an examination of what his intelligence considerations might or should have been at the time. We will avoid speculation as much as possible and instead rely on decisions that LTC Custer made as well as the actions he took on the battlefield in order to understand the use of information by his Command during the battle.

Custer did have some past experience with fighting Indians on the Plains and he was successful. In particular, it is now widely agreed that his maneuver strategy focused on capturing a good portion of the noncombatants in order to bring any battle to a quick, and as possible, nonviolent conclusion as possible so that his mission of moving the tribes back to the reservations could be accomplished. We should expect also that Custer understood the way that the Indians fought. Their leadership was not as hierarchical as that of the US Cavalry, and rather their movements could be predicted to swarm, stalk, and surround if possible so that their numbers could be brought to bear in close combat. Until that critical point, they might be held at bay by accurate and sufficient (group) fire of the US Army-issued Springfield Carbines--effective over the Indian weapons at ranges between 400 (when fired in volley)-200 meters. At distances approaching 100 meters, the Indian swarming tactics and weapons could overwhelm the US advantages in range and "settle" the fight very quickly. The Indians knew this and the US forces knew this fact.  For a good description of the maneuver of the battle, please refer to the YouTube site, CusterApollo - YouTube. I will tend to disagree with that author's conclusions and inferences, although I am not in dispute with his presentation of the maneuver during the battle, which I think is the best description I have come across.

It is apparent from the descriptions of Custer's movements on the battlefield that he habitually used the technique of reconnaissance by fire in order to determine the strength and proximity of enemy forces. We see this technique both at Ford B and Ford D. If the enemy tends to swarm in a non-hierarchal manner on contact, then this appears to me to be an excellent means to fix the enemy and to assess his strength. I suspect that Custer employed the same technique when he divided his forces--giving Benteen and Reno an equal three companies each to explore the approaches to the Little Bighorn battlefield and into and along the Little Bighorn valley. In other words, Custer was sincere in directing Benteen to bring to contact any forces in the folds of the ridges on the "scout to the left" and for Reno to engage the enemy along the river. The idea would be to have the enemy, if they were present, to swarm to the point of engagement. At the same time, since Indian encampments tend to be by creeks and rivers, Benteen's scout would ensure that the pack train would not be ambushed enroute. Meanwhile, Custer's strike group of five companies would maneuver along the bluff-side of the river where he did not expect a large enemy presence. 

The point of the combined maneuvers would be to separate the combatants from the noncombatants and to expose the noncombatants to Custer's strike group. While, Custer knew that Reno would make enemy contact, he could not know if Benteen would encounter the enemy. However, Custer would become aware of this if an engagement developed along Benteen's path (the gunfire would be heard), and also would be able to confirm a lack of contact if Benteen fell back enroute along the main axis of advance--I suspect this was the task of Boston Custer. It appears that Boston Custer detached himself from the pack train and galloped to inform Custer at about the same time that Benteen's battalion would have appeared back in view.  By the time Custer reached Weir point, he knew that Reno was engaged and Benteen was not--therefore back in the vicinity of the packs. His order to Benteen confirmed that knowledge. 

The reason for having Benteen and the pack train hurry forward was that the location of the Indian village was now confirmed and that it was known to be concentrated at that location--thus there was no need to explore further. Also, Reno was engaged and the swarm of Indians would be building against him--it was not that Custer needed immediate help. At the time Custer sent the messages, he was attempting to manage a reconnaissance, not to attack. The enemy was not in contact with him at the time, except for the activity taking place as a result of Reno's attack. Custer did not know at that time that the enemy forces would overwhelm Reno, and if they did, we should expect that his orders to Benteen were to give the promised support as Benteen came up along the axis of advance. The flow of US forces in the assault followed South-North and would flow North to South along the river if in retreat. Thus, Benteen could not avoid rolling up upon Reno if the Reno engagement battle traveled southward (in retreat). 

Certainly, Benteen was not expected to leave a beleaguered Reno to fight alone against a far superior Indian swarm. Why do historians even assume this would enter Custer's mind? Or be assumed by Benteen? That thought is absurd. Nor should anyone assume that Custer would not support Reno as promised or that Custer was so cold to the fate of Reno's battalion as to give no concern for the outcome of the engagement. Reno's mission was to stir up an Indian swarm, not to overrun them if they were superior in force. Reno did what was expected of him and Custer was apparently satisfied with the way that Reno was deploying his forces, otherwise, he could easily have sent an alternative order to Benteen to support Reno's attack rather than to simply "Come on and be quick". The fact that Benteen would do what was feasible and best was assumed. He was a seasoned veteran and would not have been entrusted with a battalion otherwise; likewise Reno.

The subtext of this "reconnaissance by fire" approach is that the elements that make contact are unknowing pawns to a certain degree. They should attract a swarming enemy, but be sufficient enough so that they hold that contact without collapsing while the maneuver elements either come to their support (if the enemy strength is too much), or can locate and attack the separated noncombatants (ideally). Thus, Custer told Reno that Reno would be supported, but not much more. I believe Custer's movement to Ford B was an attempt to support Reno as necessary and in any case to determine the effect of the Reno's assault. However, by that time Reno was routed back to Reno Hill and not to be found. The enemy forces were simply too large and too aggressive. This was the singular surprise that Custer should have better considered, but underestimated even beyond the allowances of his tactics.

The surprising thing about the Reno engagement, I expect, was not that Reno was forced into retreat, but rather that Reno was able to break contact and find a defensible location, whereupon it was the enemy that broke contact. It is ironic that Custer’s appearance at Ford B was most likely the reason that the Indian swarm broke contact with Reno. Custer's strike group was maneuvered to shield it as much as possible from enemy observation except for this one instance up to that point of the battle. 

The fact that the Indians became aware of his group and quickly reoriented on it appears to have not been Custer's plan. However, I believe that Custer made provisions to become aware of this possibility in that he continuously positioned Keogh's wing of the strike group to act as a rearguard as Custer led E and F companies in a probe in the Ford B and D areas. Custer was positioning himself to either support or attack dependent on his own assessment of the situation at the point of own probes. This is not a bad idea. In maneuver warfare, the situation changes very dynamically and the right decision at the right point with the right force is what changes the battle. Custer was a demonstrated expert in this aspect of warfare.

By the lack of enemy in the Ford B area, Custer would know that Reno was routed (or annihilated) back towards the South and that the largest portion of the enemy was in that proximity as well. However, with Benteen coming up, there was a question of whether Benteen and the pack train (which were to be guarded under Benteen's battalion and not left behind), would reach either Reno or Keogh. Custer needed a signal whether friendly of enemy forces reached Keogh first. If the enemy, Custer would know that Benteen was either stuck supporting Reno, or perhaps defeated as well. If Benteen somehow made it to Keogh, the assumption would have to be that either Reno had fled the field or that his command was annihilated, because he certainly was nowhere in the vicinity of Ford B as Custer determined himself.  

The volleys were that signal--apparently two volleys meant that the enemy had arrived first to the Keogh rearguard position on Luce ridge (which made sense--why waste ammunition on signaling if those two volleys could be put to effect against the enemy? we should suppose that one volley would mean that Benteen arrived). Upon this signal, Custer withdrew from his probe at Ford B and rejoined Keogh, then moved together further north to Calhoun Hill where Keogh was again reestablished in a rearguard position. There was no attempt to further support or rescue Benteen/Reno. Whatever time that existed for that group to engage and fix the enemy was now running out.

Custer still had five companies to his knowledge and perhaps still some chance to bring the battle to a conclusion if he could capture the noncombatants. The hope would have been that Reno/Benteen's fight engaged enough enemy warriors that the noncombatants were relatively undefended.  This would also mean that Benteen and the rest of the Regiment would not be seen anytime soon if at all. The signal of the volleys was for Custer--not for Benteen. Why have a signal that is not prearranged? Custer intended for Benteen and Reno to be probes---not the maneuvering element. They were the pawns just as Sturgis was at Ford B and Yates at Ford D.

Benteen and Reno did exactly what Custer had wanted them to do, according to this understanding of information flow on the battlefield. There is absolutely no reason for the recriminations. When Custer heard the volleys, he knew that a force strong enough to defeat Reno and to deter Benteen was falling on Keough (at perhaps 400m) and that Keough had little time to spare. In fact, Custer's time was up as well. With either insufficient force at Ford B, a lack of noncombatants, and no Reno, the only hope was to intercept the noncombatants further north. It was never in the plan to fight through to Reno/Benteen and to admit defeat. Reno/Benteen were sacrificial pawns if necessary. The only force that must be preserved was the strike group. 

The battle was concluded when although Ford D and the noncombatants were found, Keogh's wing was obliterated so there was insufficient force to overcome what defenses existed at Ford D and consummate the attack on and seizure of the noncombatants. Apparently, Custer suffered from some period of indecision as the Keogh wing of the strike group was being obliterated and Custer neither came to their support nor committed to the strike against the noncombatants at Ford D.  I suspect that the idea of saving the two companies and Regimental headquarters by fleeing the battlefield to unite with Terry must have occurred but was decided against. Custer's group stood together and fought together until the end. If the group that tried to break out from last stand hill was that remnant that wanted to flee to Terry, they had already done their duty by that time and might as well have tried. The enemy forces were simply too strong, and Custer had split his own forces too much. In fact, apparently the enemy defenses in the Ford D area were tried twice and each time they were found to be too strong to launch the seizure attempt. While the plan to separate the combatants largely from the noncombatants worked, the force imbalance was too much to maintain this separation and to make a successful seizure.

There is no purpose in capturing noncombatants if only two companies of your entire Command are left and the rest wiped out. Custer knew that the swarm that fell upon Reno was falling upon the equally sized Keogh force. The only honorable thing to do would be to stand with the remnants of the Command and perhaps save the Regimental colors. And after the desultory attacks at Ford D, that is what Custer did. Furthermore, it should be noted that Custer's note to Benteen is generally interpreted as a cry for help by Custer to aid Custer. This assumes far too much. The only presumption we should make is that it is the final and termination of a series of orders directing Benteen's "scout to the left" and that it emphasized that the Pack Train was now Benteen's (and no one else's) responsibility to bring ahead. Benteen did not have reason to assume that he should come ahead either by the bluffs or the valley until he himself witnessed Reno's forces scrambling to the bluffs. As far as Benteen knew at the time, the fight could be in the valley, not the bluffs regardless of which direction Custer's strike force took after Ford A. Afterall, Custer might have crossed by that time at Ford B had either the Reno or Indian situation developed other than it did. 

The entire US 7th Cavalry acted honorably. The enemy force was simply several times larger and fought with much more zeal than the US Military's best estimate. The 7th Cavalry was lucky that some of its companies escaped--but this was primarily due to the leadership of Reno in the timbers in making a timely escape and in Benteen in formulating the defense of Reno-Benteen Hill. It was never intended that Benteen would come to Custer's aide if Reno was defeated. Either Benteen would be aiding Reno or fighting the large body of enemy that had defeated Reno. I believe this was part of Custer's plan and that it was not communicated to Reno and Benteen in advance, because of the unfortunate side-effect of being absolutely demoralizing had they had known that it was necessary for them to be the potentially sacrificial pawns.

What went wrong? Custer's force should have been a reconnaissance and blocking force, not the strike group. There should have been no attack of any magnitude until Terry was on the field. Therefore, IMHO, the fault lies with the overall plan of the campaign. Given the task to act as a strike group, Custer, to the best of his knowledge, acted as a strike group. If we must criticize, then the only clear action that I can see is that Custer should have better perceived the impact of a large dynamic enemy on his initial plan from his observation at Weir point. This meant that he had only one chance to “get it right” and so rather than attempting an attack as close as Ford B, he should have gone straight into an attack at Ford D with all five companies and go for broke. In other words, he did not have the luxury to be cautious or incremental. 

As a final note, I believe that the Indians far understated their own causalities, which probably approached 600. There was a tendency for some Indians to claim that large numbers of the 7th committed suicide, where the evidence strongly speaks to the opposite--that the wounded were murdered by the Indians. This should not be forgotten or forgiven as a cultural consideration. The wanton and intentional murder of those who are either noncombatants or hors de combat, is fundamentally evil to any coherent morality. A culture that refuses to extend mercy and compassion to the helpless is not a culture that by its own measure can exist peacefully with others. This lesson, thankfully, did finally prevail. Legitimate land disputes should be settled peacefully. It is only dust and a way of life is only a way of life when it involves living. Otherwise, it is a way of death. Had the mission of the 7th Cavalry been that of the Indians, there would be no historical need for an elaborate analysis of maneuver or information.

On the current (and past) Kerfuffles: Our Soldiers return from the GWOT

Shortly after witnessing the greatest bloodbath of his time at the Battle of Borodino, outside the gates of Moscow, Clausewitz reflected on the nature of war: was it the extension of politics by other means or a large wrestling match? Along this dialectic, he would find the answer. Its nature is chaotic--the large divergence from small initial gaps. Our understanding of the outcome of the Global War on Terror is such a mindset divergence. We went into the wars thinking one thing with a common national mythology and learned along the way coming out at the end with divergent viewpoints that have not yet been reconciled.

So, it was in the case during the Souix Wars of the Great Planes, Vietnam, and for that matter, all wars we have been involved. It is important to learn these lessons--they always seem to be freshly learned by each generation unfortunately--and it is important also to have a memory of the truth of the original casus belli, as it existed although with a small initial gap as we entered upon the war. The sooner we reconcile ourselves in this dialect the sooner we will achieve domestic tranquility. The truer the lesson that we learn, the greater the chance for us to avoid squandering our national treasure and posterity while maintaining our national integrity and security. We should take this opportunity seriously.

On the one hand of the dialectic, we have the current GOP vice Presidential candidate and on the other, the current Democrat vice Presidential candidate. If not yet by their current speech, we have by their actions the dialectic response to the question, "Can the US achieve greater security by the overthrow of totalitarian regimes and replacement by forceful democracy-building?"

Rather than name-call and questioning the service of those we sent in danger's way--one as a seasoned citizen-soldier and the other as an extremely talented aspirant--let's have this debate with a memory of our (almost) unity and mutual respect when we set off on this journey and let us strive to retain that respect as we discuss these issues. The potential price of continuing a divergent path could not be higher. The importance in learning the truth of the lesson could not be more valuable.

On Entropy and System Identification

Recently, I have been reading Stephen Wolfram's, The Second Law, and might now better comment on entropy and how it is related to system identification.  Note that the statistical form of entropy is as the expectation of the logarithm of probabilities of parts of some partition. In thermodynamics, the change in entropy is the change in heat of a system normalized by absolute temperature.  This heat is distributed over a partition of molecules. Heat in a vacuum cannot be held--simply transmitted by radiation. 

Molecules hold heat by the excitation of their kinematics which is perceivable as temperature. Energy can additionally be held by elevation of states of electron shells which collapse and emit photons that carry heat by radiation; convection is the mass movement of energetic molecules and conduction is the transfer of energy between molecules caused by collision. Below the level of the molecule, there is no sense in the thermodynamic understanding of entropy. Subatomic particles do not all have mass and do not all act as a molecule does. Not everything in the universe consists of molecules in contact with each other and therefore, the idea of heat death of the universe is nonsense. Please do not worry about it. It makes a person dour and prone to nihilism (q.v. Boltzmann).

The point here is that whether it is used in information theory or thermodynamics, the concept of entropy is simply a mathematical relation for a system characterized by multiplicative interactions that can be decomposed by additive parts via the logarithm--it is a model. Where the model is appropriate, as in the case of heat among molecules, it is a useful quantification of the state. Where it is not, it is not used. Thus, the "Second Law" has limited applicability. It is not even applicable as we generally believe it to be. Energy lost by radiation makes a process irreversible, not by some miracle of the creation of greater "entropy" but rather by the simple loss of energy under the First Law. Heat is a catch-all term for perceptible energy in matter that tracks to temperature. Heat is simply a form of energy--it is not every form. Thermodynamic entropy only applies to heat.

Interestingly, many also confuse the phenomenon of mixing as also being entropic--but this is not properly understood either. Mixing of molecules in three dimensions occurs because the mean free travel between molecules tends to a maximum simply by the physics of motion and the fact that the energy transmitted by collisions is not unidirectional.  Entropic models may fit these systems only because the mathematics fits. There is nothing special about the physics that links one entropically-described process to another. Entropy is a model, not a law of nature applicable to everything.

So, while I do not share Stephen's excitement, I may share in some of his insights. Entropy is a useful mathematical concept for the decomposition of a multiplicative system into constituent parts. That is all.

To End the Russian-Ukrainian War

Systems rise and fall by their characteristic modes of operation because those modes simply express some underlying truth of nature. The Ukrainian invasion was made possible by such a characteristic within the Russian state--a characteristic that has not changed much over the last several hundred years. Such a strong characteristic cannot be hidden. Indeed, it stands in plain view for all to see. 

The Russian people are still serfs in their own minds. They do not think or feel as though they are responsible for the actions and decisions of their government. The Russian people, in general, are not the stuff of successful and functional democracies. It would be a huge mistake to try to beat Russia by fighting it on its strengths. 

Why fight a war of attrition with a country and people that will not give proper attribution to its losses? Instead, achieve the goal of a long and prosperous peace by pulling out the sticks that support the facade. 

Russia is morally and politically corrupt. Hang these modern-day fascists with their own rope. We have seen that hundreds of thousands of young Russians will flee the country rather than fight Putin's war. What if that number was multiplied by ten? The country would collapse economically, and those that remain would be left to ponder their predicament--perhaps even to learn. 

What if the western democracies offered citizenship and guaranteed jobs/income to any Russian that could flee across the border? We could see perhaps 10 million Russians emigrate--enough to hollow out Putin's war machine. Better yet, it would perhaps finally achieve the objectives of NATO and put an end to the threat of Russian aggression. It would cost perhaps $100 billion dollars and effectively win a war without the tragic destruction of the alternative.

Afghanistan: Who are we really fooling?

Well, oh well. Look at all the shocked faces, and all with a finger to point. The rapid fall of Afghanistan should have surprised no one.  We had seen the very same phenomenon when ISIS overran northern Iraq and sent that ersatz army fleeing. And the atrocities that followed should have surprised no one just as the slaughterhouse that Afghanistan is about to become should leave no one claiming that they had no idea that the Taliban was not the reincarnation of Nelson Mandela's ANC.

How do we know? Besides direct deduction? Just ask yourself several counterfactuals:

Question 1. If you were the lead intelligence officer for US armed forces and you could make a fantastic case for what was about to happen, would your boss, the Commander, care?

Ans. Not a chance. He wants to be the new Gen Milley someday. Why upset the applecart? He knows that the POTUS doesn't want to hear it.

Question 2. What if you were the SecDef or SecState?

Ans. Well, you don't care. What do you care about? Not much of real consequence. Deals mostly.

Question 3. What if you were Biden?

Ans. One word: Ice Cream! 

You see, the problem is not just that our political leaders are not very bright, it is primarily that they don't care. And BTW, before we get partisan, none of them really cared. Bush didn't even care about Iraq until a light went off in his head connecting the impending doom of Iraq, the model, with his own prospects for reelection in that case (and this needed to be almost spelled out for him).

Yes, our political leaders have no clue about much except their own political prospects and they have cultivated a Pretorian guard of imbeciles that will tell them just about whatever they want to hear. Remember the aluminum tubes? How many geniuses did it take to figure out that they were not meant for centrifuges? Turns out just one professor on leave to the DOE--we should probably hire that guy and fire the rest of the National Intelligence Apparatus.

Now, these people are not actually stupid, but their total lack of moral fiber makes them so. After all, they were smart enough to take loads of your tax money and they all have a much better retirement account. But we weren't really fooled either. Truth be told, we "normal" people mostly just don't care about our own government and that is why we tolerate such mediocrities. Even a dunce can be useful if he annoys the other guy more than he embarrasses our team. 

It's all just a game with one side scoring points on the other. Meanwhile, the few that are not in the game do their best to pretend that the direction of government is unimportant--sort of a self-driving car made by German engineers--it will get you there eventually. Enjoy the ride.

So as the slaughter of the innocent is about to unfold in Afghanistan, we can be happy that we were smart enough not to be there ourselves. We will never find ourselves in such a situation, right? After all, we are protected by our government of the People. Surely, they will not let us down.

Just one small problem there.....

You guessed it. We are the problem and our insipid political leadership is just a reflection of our own debased values. It couldn't be any clearer. The fault lies not in our stars, but in ourselves. That should be no surprise to anyone. The character of a nation is simply the aggregate of the character of its People.

The Unescapable Logic

Let's take a look at why The Shape of Things to Come was correct as a prediction (and please remember this analysis was done at a time when there was fierce speculation even among experts that were in no way as accurate as the post).

The first principle is that the economy is a system that is always quasi-stable near some equilibrium point. Economic expansion means that excess goods are produced along with the chits to redeem  them by people who somehow are considered to have merited the chits. An economic contraction means that the causal relations for incentivizing the goods production and chit distribution squirrel cage has broken down. If this goes on long enough, the consumption necessary to sustain relative prosperity overtakes the production and a cycle of poverty can set in.

In the first round of lockdowns, we as a group decided to forego prosperity for the imaginary chits of safety. Consumption went along, but not at much of a pace that it would jeopardize the imaginary value of the chits (money given out by a government with a large printing press). What did happen, however, was that the squirrel cage of work and value was put askew. Disproportionately, the service sector was nullified and the chits standing in for the value of an education were devalued. This might go on for a bit and perhaps nothing would be the worse since much of US education is a worthless waste of time, anyhow. But, there is a but ...

What if that adjustment to the running of the squirrel cage caused enough people to decide that the education was not worth the effort? There will always be some. But what if this small trickle became a gusher? Would there be a corrective mechanism within the system to put it back in line? For STEM degrees from first tier universities, of course. But not necessarily for the rest, most of whom incidentally seek to redeem those chits in the recently nullified service sector. That amplifying confluence of forces may have an effect outside its initial expectations.

Those chits rely on the belief that they can be redeemed later in life. When that belief is broken, an alternate valuation must be adopted. The problem with university educations are that they are largely inherently worthless and already many of the students, if not the majority, understand this. Why pay for it if it is not necessary?

If enough excess value is drained by the system through consumption, we will reach a point where subsidies must be prioritized. The student loan system stands out as one where $1.4T of debt is probably too much to write off. We cannot pay students not to pay their loans even if those loans are ultimately back to the government. So some proportion of that debt will be reexamined by the students and if found worthless, a wave of defaults will occur so much so that our economic system will be forced to reconfigure the education system.

I doubt that the "new normal" can survive when children and college students are sent back to class. And when that happens, the pandemic will appear to be something of a fraud regardless the spike in elderly deaths. A reevaluation of assumptions will be the zeitgeist.

The second principle is that unexpected changes to the equilibrium have unexpected consequences, and the most difficult to predict are inflections in human value systems. For example, we once valued books not only for their information but as symbols of learning. Take a look next time you are visiting with an "educated" friend or even a professor. Where are the books? Not so much as once were common.

It is not just that so-called educated people don't own books, they do not read books or consider them important. This is especially common among today's students. Consider this as a precursor. The question is, "What does knowledge have to do with my success?" It's fine to say that this is nonsense, but is it?

These are the absurdities that appear just before major societal corrections. We once thought that family was critical to success. No so much anymore. Pedigree is not destiny.

There has been a slow but steady trend to devalue actual education. This may be the jolt to upset the institutional apple cart. If so, I doubt it was expected that 50% of $1.4T could head towards default in a catastrophe. But I do not see what there is to stop it either. Eventually, all such absurdities are eradicated from a functioning system as it changes modes.

The alternative view is that the value of the "education" is simply as a credential to gain employment in the government or corporate sector--that the value is in being socialized for the purposes of the government/corporate interests and not so much for knowledge. If we consider that corporations and government aligns with a feeling-type personality, then college is simply a feedback loop of resources for the indoctrination of the future corporate fodder.  Is this a cynical approach? Yes, but maybe just so. College education in the US is a paradox of absurdities with one constant--socialization.

If so, then systematic default in student loans would gladly be borne by the government without any reconfiguration of the "educational" enterprise. Failure will be subsidized if political conformity is achieved. In that sense, it it not failure per se.

Let's see.

The Shape of Things to Come

Some things are fairly well known. Let's start from those.

1. In the US, for the week of April 15, the average daily death toll will be a couple thousand coming mainly from the Northeast corridor.

2. Beginning in the week of April 21, if lockdowns persist, the unemployment rate will raise to over 15% and moderate size non-service oriented businesses will begin layoffs.

3. In the week of April 28, if the lockdown persists, the central government will no longer have enough credit to float the system, and businesses will follow their own pattern of adaptation.

Which means that within the next week, (the week of April 15), the central governments around the EU and North America have a decision to make:

A. Admit that the pandemic is out of control and instead prioritize the economy.

B. Double down into economic catastrophe.


My guess is that the governments will choose A. In that case, we have a very interesting social condition that will develop in that the free peoples will be divided amongst themselves on the basis of age. Going into the 2020 election, we will see that develop in political terms as well. I would expect that the Democrats will demagogue the issues and attempt to have it both ways before strongly siding with socialist-type interventions that are not economically feasible. The Republican, lacking strong leadership, will dance in the wind as they hope for the situation to resolve itself.

So by mid-May, we will have a new normal. The economy will be reopened but the virus will not be defeated. The daily death toll will remain in the thousands, but most people will begin to adapt to the threat, having learned effectively nothing. With a depressed economy and no excess capital to spend, certain changes will need to be made:

1. Higher education will cease to be a four-year vacation for the indolent on loans. The student loan system collapses under the weight of unpayable loans built on fraudulent education, bloated administrations, and a squirrel cage system of raising costs without value.

2. The financial system will be sacked of a great proportion of its liquidity.

3. The service sector will remain contracted, not for the virus, but because there is no money to spend.

4. Capital investments will contract and political solutions will be proposed that are in fact confiscations of wealth.

5. The legal system will lose legitimacy to the degree that court orders are not enforced by fiat, but rather only through negotiation.


Well, let's see.