The Unknown Unknowns are what get you Killed: Mallory and Irvine

As posted at Everest Mystery:

Postmortem: My guess is that Irvine achieved his weight reductions by breaking the seals between the backup bottles and the regulator with the idea that he could reseal a bottle to a single regulator (one at a time) with a good spanner. This is why they broke down the rigs and "saved" weight. (he got rid of the "redundancy" of multiple regulators or a manifold/lines--about 5 lbs. worth per rig). The real reason was to enable caching of the bottles, I suspect.

However, after the first bottle, he found that in the extreme cold he could not achieve the sort of seal that he could at base camp (probably due to stiction/Blish effect) which was outside of his undergraduate education. There is some evidence that they exactly had this problem when testing things out.

This would have given them 4 hours of O2, and not much more. Thus, they would have reached the point where the No 9 bottle was found and spent the next three hours beating the hell out of the remaining bottles with their spanner. At 1:27 PM, in a snow squall and being out of O2 for some time and frustrated beyond comprehension, Mallory took one wrong step.

And that was that. Odell may have seen/heard it--I think so. Because he knew enough to try to poke around at that time but also enough that they were dead or about to be.

Note--we know that Irvine disassembled the rig. So, this idea can be tested before running off and accusing anyone of lying (or worse yet--the arrogance of undergraduate ignorance). I am only proposing this idea. But it answers everything as far as I can see. The bottles at that time were not able to be resealed under the conditions of the dead zone. 

The fact that many of these bottles were already breaking seals in Tibet is a testament to the limits of a threaded seal at that time and the variability of the threads under extreme conditions, not that some bottles were "bad" and the others "good". It's all about confidence limits and statistics. At two sigma you may have a number of good ones, that goes down exponentially at three sigma. Irvine would not have known this.

They never came close to the summit.

The Real A.I.

 By the data processing inequality, we know that AI will never achieve greater information (intelligence) than what goes into it. As noted in the previous post, a local instance of AI may learn from communications with another, but the data processing inequality holds.

So, our objective is the utility of AI. In other words, to use it as a handy, accessible repository of helpful (true) information, not as a font of new knowledge or as a replacement of human thought. The key in its use then is to tune it with human insight to correct mistakes and add surgically to the structure of the AI knowledge base. Perhaps the best method of augmentation is through counterfactuals.

Counterfactuals have the benefit of being built over a human-understandable Structured Causal Model (SCM) and so are very pointed, Not only that, the change that might be induced in the AI knowledge base can be very directed, i.e. systematized with little or no confounding.

The automation of increased AI knowledge base efficacy is the challenge of the future of AI. Human insight and direction is the one method for this to be done consistently and reliably.

Chaotic Interactions and AGI

Godel's First Incompleteness Theorems tells us that a formal system is either complete or consistent. Or, equivalently by the data processing inequality, the information generated by a computer will be something less than the sum of its own complexity and that of its input. In other words, computers have no ability to innovate outside their programming and (static) environment. Thus, they do not "think".

But what if a computer was in communication with at least two other computers? The environment of any one computer might be considered to be the other two in that closed communication system. In such a system, "chaotic interactions" might occur. The reason why three computers would be necessary is, like the three-body problem, one computer might instantaneously serve as an entropy sink for the communication between the other two thus allowing them to explore a range of innovation outside their natural limitations. These two computers might, in respect to themselves and given this informationally dynamic environment, appear to innovate, i.e. to think.

Information on the Battlefield: The Battle of Little Bighorn

Let's take a new look at the Battle of Little Bighorn, but from the vantage point of a prospective Intelligence Officer, had there been such a thing at the time. For practical purposes, the functions of Operations and Intelligence were combined under the Commander of the 7th Cavalry, LTC Custer. So this is an examination of what his intelligence considerations might or should have been at the time. We will avoid speculation as much as possible and instead rely on decisions that LTC Custer made as well as the actions he took on the battlefield in order to understand the use of information by his Command during the battle.

Custer did have some past experience with fighting Indians on the Plains and he was successful. In particular, it is now widely agreed that his maneuver strategy focused on capturing a good portion of the noncombatants in order to bring any battle to a quick, and as possible, nonviolent conclusion as possible so that his mission of moving the tribes back to the reservations could be accomplished. We should expect also that Custer understood the way that the Indians fought. Their leadership was not as hierarchical as that of the US Cavalry, and rather their movements could be predicted to swarm, stalk, and surround if possible so that their numbers could be brought to bear in close combat. Until that critical point, they might be held at bay by accurate and sufficient (group) fire of the US Army-issued Springfield Carbines--effective over the Indian weapons at ranges between 400 (when fired in volley)-200 meters. At distances approaching 100 meters, the Indian swarming tactics and weapons could overwhelm the US advantages in range and "settle" the fight very quickly. The Indians knew this and the US forces knew this fact.  For a good description of the maneuver of the battle, please refer to the YouTube site, CusterApollo - YouTube. I will tend to disagree with that author's conclusions and inferences, although I am not in dispute with his presentation of the maneuver during the battle, which I think is the best description I have come across.

It is apparent from the descriptions of Custer's movements on the battlefield that he habitually used the technique of reconnaissance by fire in order to determine the strength and proximity of enemy forces. We see this technique both at Ford B and Ford D. If the enemy tends to swarm in a non-hierarchal manner on contact, then this appears to me to be an excellent means to fix the enemy and to assess his strength. I suspect that Custer employed the same technique when he divided his forces--giving Benteen and Reno an equal three companies each to explore the approaches to the Little Bighorn battlefield and into and along the Little Bighorn valley. In other words, Custer was sincere in directing Benteen to bring to contact any forces in the folds of the ridges on the "scout to the left" and for Reno to engage the enemy along the river. The idea would be to have the enemy, if they were present, to swarm to the point of engagement. At the same time, since Indian encampments tend to be by creeks and rivers, Benteen's scout would ensure that the pack train would not be ambushed enroute. Meanwhile, Custer's strike group of five companies would maneuver along the bluff-side of the river where he did not expect a large enemy presence. 

The point of the combined maneuvers would be to separate the combatants from the noncombatants and to expose the noncombatants to Custer's strike group. While, Custer knew that Reno would make enemy contact, he could not know if Benteen would encounter the enemy. However, Custer would become aware of this if an engagement developed along Benteen's path (the gunfire would be heard), and also would be able to confirm a lack of contact if Benteen fell back enroute along the main axis of advance--I suspect this was the task of Boston Custer. It appears that Boston Custer detached himself from the pack train and galloped to inform Custer at about the same time that Benteen's battalion would have appeared back in view.  By the time Custer reached Weir point, he knew that Reno was engaged and Benteen was not--therefore back in the vicinity of the packs. His order to Benteen confirmed that knowledge. 

The reason for having Benteen and the pack train hurry forward was that the location of the Indian village was now confirmed and that it was known to be concentrated at that location--thus there was no need to explore further. Also, Reno was engaged and the swarm of Indians would be building against him--it was not that Custer needed immediate help. At the time Custer sent the messages, he was attempting to manage a reconnaissance, not to attack. The enemy was not in contact with him at the time, except for the activity taking place as a result of Reno's attack. Custer did not know at that time that the enemy forces would overwhelm Reno, and if they did, we should expect that his orders to Benteen were to give the promised support as Benteen came up along the axis of advance. The flow of US forces in the assault followed South-North and would flow North to South along the river if in retreat. Thus, Benteen could not avoid rolling up upon Reno if the Reno engagement battle traveled southward (in retreat). 

Certainly, Benteen was not expected to leave a beleaguered Reno to fight alone against a far superior Indian swarm. Why do historians even assume this would enter Custer's mind? Or be assumed by Benteen? That thought is absurd. Nor should anyone assume that Custer would not support Reno as promised or that Custer was so cold to the fate of Reno's battalion as to give no concern for the outcome of the engagement. Reno's mission was to stir up an Indian swarm, not to overrun them if they were superior in force. Reno did what was expected of him and Custer was apparently satisfied with the way that Reno was deploying his forces, otherwise, he could easily have sent an alternative order to Benteen to support Reno's attack rather than to simply "Come on and be quick". The fact that Benteen would do what was feasible and best was assumed. He was a seasoned veteran and would not have been entrusted with a battalion otherwise; likewise Reno.

The subtext of this "reconnaissance by fire" approach is that the elements that make contact are unknowing pawns to a certain degree. They should attract a swarming enemy, but be sufficient enough so that they hold that contact without collapsing while the maneuver elements either come to their support (if the enemy strength is too much), or can locate and attack the separated noncombatants (ideally). Thus, Custer told Reno that Reno would be supported, but not much more. I believe Custer's movement to Ford B was an attempt to support Reno as necessary and in any case to determine the effect of the Reno's assault. However, by that time Reno was routed back to Reno Hill and not to be found. The enemy forces were simply too large and too aggressive. This was the singular surprise that Custer should have better considered, but underestimated even beyond the allowances of his tactics.

The surprising thing about the Reno engagement, I expect, was not that Reno was forced into retreat, but rather that Reno was able to break contact and find a defensible location, whereupon it was the enemy that broke contact. It is ironic that Custer’s appearance at Ford B was most likely the reason that the Indian swarm broke contact with Reno. Custer's strike group was maneuvered to shield it as much as possible from enemy observation except for this one instance up to that point of the battle. 

The fact that the Indians became aware of his group and quickly reoriented on it appears to have not been Custer's plan. However, I believe that Custer made provisions to become aware of this possibility in that he continuously positioned Keogh's wing of the strike group to act as a rearguard as Custer led E and F companies in a probe in the Ford B and D areas. Custer was positioning himself to either support or attack dependent on his own assessment of the situation at the point of own probes. This is not a bad idea. In maneuver warfare, the situation changes very dynamically and the right decision at the right point with the right force is what changes the battle. Custer was a demonstrated expert in this aspect of warfare.

By the lack of enemy in the Ford B area, Custer would know that Reno was routed (or annihilated) back towards the South and that the largest portion of the enemy was in that proximity as well. However, with Benteen coming up, there was a question of whether Benteen and the pack train (which were to be guarded under Benteen's battalion and not left behind), would reach either Reno or Keogh. Custer needed a signal whether friendly of enemy forces reached Keogh first. If the enemy, Custer would know that Benteen was either stuck supporting Reno, or perhaps defeated as well. If Benteen somehow made it to Keogh, the assumption would have to be that either Reno had fled the field or that his command was annihilated, because he certainly was nowhere in the vicinity of Ford B as Custer determined himself.  

The volleys were that signal--apparently two volleys meant that the enemy had arrived first to the Keogh rearguard position on Luce ridge (which made sense--why waste ammunition on signaling if those two volleys could be put to effect against the enemy? we should suppose that one volley would mean that Benteen arrived). Upon this signal, Custer withdrew from his probe at Ford B and rejoined Keogh, then moved together further north to Calhoun Hill where Keogh was again reestablished in a rearguard position. There was no attempt to further support or rescue Benteen/Reno. Whatever time that existed for that group to engage and fix the enemy was now running out.

Custer still had five companies to his knowledge and perhaps still some chance to bring the battle to a conclusion if he could capture the noncombatants. The hope would have been that Reno/Benteen's fight engaged enough enemy warriors that the noncombatants were relatively undefended.  This would also mean that Benteen and the rest of the Regiment would not be seen anytime soon if at all. The signal of the volleys was for Custer--not for Benteen. Why have a signal that is not prearranged? Custer intended for Benteen and Reno to be probes---not the maneuvering element. They were the pawns just as Sturgis was at Ford B and Yates at Ford D.

Benteen and Reno did exactly what Custer had wanted them to do, according to this understanding of information flow on the battlefield. There is absolutely no reason for the recriminations. When Custer heard the volleys, he knew that a force strong enough to defeat Reno and to deter Benteen was falling on Keough (at perhaps 400m) and that Keough had little time to spare. In fact, Custer's time was up as well. With either insufficient force at Ford B, a lack of noncombatants, and no Reno, the only hope was to intercept the noncombatants further north. It was never in the plan to fight through to Reno/Benteen and to admit defeat. Reno/Benteen were sacrificial pawns if necessary. The only force that must be preserved was the strike group. 

The battle was concluded when although Ford D and the noncombatants were found, Keogh's wing was obliterated so there was insufficient force to overcome what defenses existed at Ford D and consummate the attack on and seizure of the noncombatants. Apparently, Custer suffered from some period of indecision as the Keogh wing of the strike group was being obliterated and Custer neither came to their support nor committed to the strike against the noncombatants at Ford D.  I suspect that the idea of saving the two companies and Regimental headquarters by fleeing the battlefield to unite with Terry must have occurred but was decided against. Custer's group stood together and fought together until the end. If the group that tried to break out from last stand hill was that remnant that wanted to flee to Terry, they had already done their duty by that time and might as well have tried. The enemy forces were simply too strong, and Custer had split his own forces too much. In fact, apparently the enemy defenses in the Ford D area were tried twice and each time they were found to be too strong to launch the seizure attempt. While the plan to separate the combatants largely from the noncombatants worked, the force imbalance was too much to maintain this separation and to make a successful seizure.

There is no purpose in capturing noncombatants if only two companies of your entire Command are left and the rest wiped out. Custer knew that the swarm that fell upon Reno was falling upon the equally sized Keogh force. The only honorable thing to do would be to stand with the remnants of the Command and perhaps save the Regimental colors. And after the desultory attacks at Ford D, that is what Custer did. Furthermore, it should be noted that Custer's note to Benteen is generally interpreted as a cry for help by Custer to aid Custer. This assumes far too much. The only presumption we should make is that it is the final and termination of a series of orders directing Benteen's "scout to the left" and that it emphasized that the Pack Train was now Benteen's (and no one else's) responsibility to bring ahead. Benteen did not have reason to assume that he should come ahead either by the bluffs or the valley until he himself witnessed Reno's forces scrambling to the bluffs. As far as Benteen knew at the time, the fight could be in the valley, not the bluffs regardless of which direction Custer's strike force took after Ford A. Afterall, Custer might have crossed by that time at Ford B had either the Reno or Indian situation developed other than it did. 

The entire US 7th Cavalry acted honorably. The enemy force was simply several times larger and fought with much more zeal than the US Military's best estimate. The 7th Cavalry was lucky that some of its companies escaped--but this was primarily due to the leadership of Reno in the timbers in making a timely escape and in Benteen in formulating the defense of Reno-Benteen Hill. It was never intended that Benteen would come to Custer's aide if Reno was defeated. Either Benteen would be aiding Reno or fighting the large body of enemy that had defeated Reno. I believe this was part of Custer's plan and that it was not communicated to Reno and Benteen in advance, because of the unfortunate side-effect of being absolutely demoralizing had they had known that it was necessary for them to be the potentially sacrificial pawns.

What went wrong? Custer's force should have been a reconnaissance and blocking force, not the strike group. There should have been no attack of any magnitude until Terry was on the field. Therefore, IMHO, the fault lies with the overall plan of the campaign. Given the task to act as a strike group, Custer, to the best of his knowledge, acted as a strike group. If we must criticize, then the only clear action that I can see is that Custer should have better perceived the impact of a large dynamic enemy on his initial plan from his observation at Weir point. This meant that he had only one chance to “get it right” and so rather than attempting an attack as close as Ford B, he should have gone straight into an attack at Ford D with all five companies and go for broke. In other words, he did not have the luxury to be cautious or incremental. 

As a final note, I believe that the Indians far understated their own causalities, which probably approached 600. There was a tendency for some Indians to claim that large numbers of the 7th committed suicide, where the evidence strongly speaks to the opposite--that the wounded were murdered by the Indians. This should not be forgotten or forgiven as a cultural consideration. The wanton and intentional murder of those who are either noncombatants or hors de combat, is fundamentally evil to any coherent morality. A culture that refuses to extend mercy and compassion to the helpless is not a culture that by its own measure can exist peacefully with others. This lesson, thankfully, did finally prevail. Legitimate land disputes should be settled peacefully. It is only dust and a way of life is only a way of life when it involves living. Otherwise, it is a way of death. Had the mission of the 7th Cavalry been that of the Indians, there would be no historical need for an elaborate analysis of maneuver or information.

On Entropy and System Identification

Recently, I have been reading Stephen Wolfram's, The Second Law, and might now better comment on entropy and how it is related to system identification.  Note that the statistical form of entropy is as the expectation of the logarithm of probabilities of parts of some partition. In thermodynamics, the change in entropy is the change in heat of a system normalized by absolute temperature.  This heat is distributed over a partition of molecules. Heat in a vacuum cannot be held--simply transmitted by radiation. 

Molecules hold heat by the excitation of their kinematics which is perceivable as temperature. Energy can additionally be held by elevation of states of electron shells which collapse and emit photons that carry heat by radiation; convection is the mass movement of energetic molecules and conduction is the transfer of energy between molecules caused by collision. Below the level of the molecule, there is no sense in the thermodynamic understanding of entropy. Subatomic particles do not all have mass and do not all act as a molecule does. Not everything in the universe consists of molecules in contact with each other and therefore, the idea of heat death of the universe is nonsense. Please do not worry about it. It makes a person dour and prone to nihilism (q.v. Boltzmann).

The point here is that whether it is used in information theory or thermodynamics, the concept of entropy is simply a mathematical relation for a system characterized by multiplicative interactions that can be decomposed by additive parts via the logarithm--it is a model. Where the model is appropriate, as in the case of heat among molecules, it is a useful quantification of the state. Where it is not, it is not used. Thus, the "Second Law" has limited applicability. It is not even applicable as we generally believe it to be. Energy lost by radiation makes a process irreversible, not by some miracle of the creation of greater "entropy" but rather by the simple loss of energy under the First Law. Heat is a catch-all term for perceptible energy in matter that tracks to temperature. Heat is simply a form of energy--it is not every form. Thermodynamic entropy only applies to heat.

Interestingly, many also confuse the phenomenon of mixing as also being entropic--but this is not properly understood either. Mixing of molecules in three dimensions occurs because the mean free travel between molecules tends to a maximum simply by the physics of motion and the fact that the energy transmitted by collisions is not unidirectional.  Entropic models may fit these systems only because the mathematics fits. There is nothing special about the physics that links one entropically-described process to another. Entropy is a model, not a law of nature applicable to everything.

So, while I do not share Stephen's excitement, I may share in some of his insights. Entropy is a useful mathematical concept for the decomposition of a multiplicative system into constituent parts. That is all.

P.S. I am not saying that the universe will not suffer heat death, just that the it will not be what we would understand by a naive belief in the second “law”.  

To End the Russian-Ukrainian War

Systems rise and fall by their characteristic modes of operation because those modes simply express some underlying truth of nature. The Ukrainian invasion was made possible by such a characteristic within the Russian state--a characteristic that has not changed much over the last several hundred years. Such a strong characteristic cannot be hidden. Indeed, it stands in plain view for all to see. 

The Russian people are still serfs in their own minds. They do not think or feel as though they are responsible for the actions and decisions of their government. The Russian people, in general, are not the stuff of successful and functional democracies. It would be a huge mistake to try to beat Russia by fighting it on its strengths. 

Why fight a war of attrition with a country and people that will not give proper attribution to its losses? Instead, achieve the goal of a long and prosperous peace by pulling out the sticks that support the facade. 

Russia is morally and politically corrupt. Hang these modern-day fascists with their own rope. We have seen that hundreds of thousands of young Russians will flee the country rather than fight Putin's war. What if that number was multiplied by ten? The country would collapse economically, and those that remain would be left to ponder their predicament--perhaps even to learn. 

What if the western democracies offered citizenship and guaranteed jobs/income to any Russian that could flee across the border? We could see perhaps 10 million Russians emigrate--enough to hollow out Putin's war machine. Better yet, it would perhaps finally achieve the objectives of NATO and put an end to the threat of Russian aggression. It would cost perhaps $100 billion dollars and effectively win a war without the tragic destruction of the alternative.

Afghanistan: Who are we really fooling?

Well, oh well. Look at all the shocked faces, and all with a finger to point. The rapid fall of Afghanistan should have surprised no one.  We had seen the very same phenomenon when ISIS overran northern Iraq and sent that ersatz army fleeing. And the atrocities that followed should have surprised no one just as the slaughterhouse that Afghanistan is about to become should leave no one claiming that they had no idea that the Taliban was not the reincarnation of Nelson Mandela's ANC.

How do we know? Besides direct deduction? Just ask yourself several counterfactuals:

Question 1. If you were the lead intelligence officer for US armed forces and you could make a fantastic case for what was about to happen, would your boss, the Commander, care?

Ans. Not a chance. He wants to be the new Gen Milley someday. Why upset the applecart? He knows that the POTUS doesn't want to hear it.

Question 2. What if you were the SecDef or SecState?

Ans. Well, you don't care. What do you care about? Not much of real consequence. Deals mostly.

Question 3. What if you were Biden?

Ans. One word: Ice Cream! 

You see, the problem is not just that our political leaders are not very bright, it is primarily that they don't care. And BTW, before we get partisan, none of them really cared. Bush didn't even care about Iraq until a light went off in his head connecting the impending doom of Iraq, the model, with his own prospects for reelection in that case (and this needed to be almost spelled out for him).

Yes, our political leaders have no clue about much except their own political prospects and they have cultivated a Pretorian guard of imbeciles that will tell them just about whatever they want to hear. Remember the aluminum tubes? How many geniuses did it take to figure out that they were not meant for centrifuges? Turns out just one professor on leave to the DOE--we should probably hire that guy and fire the rest of the National Intelligence Apparatus.

Now, these people are not actually stupid, but their total lack of moral fiber makes them so. After all, they were smart enough to take loads of your tax money and they all have a much better retirement account. But we weren't really fooled either. Truth be told, we "normal" people mostly just don't care about our own government and that is why we tolerate such mediocrities. Even a dunce can be useful if he annoys the other guy more than he embarrasses our team. 

It's all just a game with one side scoring points on the other. Meanwhile, the few that are not in the game do their best to pretend that the direction of government is unimportant--sort of a self-driving car made by German engineers--it will get you there eventually. Enjoy the ride.

So as the slaughter of the innocent is about to unfold in Afghanistan, we can be happy that we were smart enough not to be there ourselves. We will never find ourselves in such a situation, right? After all, we are protected by our government of the People. Surely, they will not let us down.

Just one small problem there.....

You guessed it. We are the problem and our insipid political leadership is just a reflection of our own debased values. It couldn't be any clearer. The fault lies not in our stars, but in ourselves. That should be no surprise to anyone. The character of a nation is simply the aggregate of the character of its People.

The Unescapable Logic

Let's take a look at why The Shape of Things to Come was correct as a prediction (and please remember this analysis was done at a time when there was fierce speculation even among experts that were in no way as accurate as the post).

The first principle is that the economy is a system that is always quasi-stable near some equilibrium point. Economic expansion means that excess goods are produced along with the chits to redeem  them by people who somehow are considered to have merited the chits. An economic contraction means that the causal relations for incentivizing the goods production and chit distribution squirrel cage has broken down. If this goes on long enough, the consumption necessary to sustain relative prosperity overtakes the production and a cycle of poverty can set in.

In the first round of lockdowns, we as a group decided to forego prosperity for the imaginary chits of safety. Consumption went along, but not at much of a pace that it would jeopardize the imaginary value of the chits (money given out by a government with a large printing press). What did happen, however, was that the squirrel cage of work and value was put askew. Disproportionately, the service sector was nullified and the chits standing in for the value of an education were devalued. This might go on for a bit and perhaps nothing would be the worse since much of US education is a worthless waste of time, anyhow. But, there is a but ...

What if that adjustment to the running of the squirrel cage caused enough people to decide that the education was not worth the effort? There will always be some. But what if this small trickle became a gusher? Would there be a corrective mechanism within the system to put it back in line? For STEM degrees from first tier universities, of course. But not necessarily for the rest, most of whom incidentally seek to redeem those chits in the recently nullified service sector. That amplifying confluence of forces may have an effect outside its initial expectations.

Those chits rely on the belief that they can be redeemed later in life. When that belief is broken, an alternate valuation must be adopted. The problem with university educations are that they are largely inherently worthless and already many of the students, if not the majority, understand this. Why pay for it if it is not necessary?

If enough excess value is drained by the system through consumption, we will reach a point where subsidies must be prioritized. The student loan system stands out as one where $1.4T of debt is probably too much to write off. We cannot pay students not to pay their loans even if those loans are ultimately back to the government. So some proportion of that debt will be reexamined by the students and if found worthless, a wave of defaults will occur so much so that our economic system will be forced to reconfigure the education system.

I doubt that the "new normal" can survive when children and college students are sent back to class. And when that happens, the pandemic will appear to be something of a fraud regardless the spike in elderly deaths. A reevaluation of assumptions will be the zeitgeist.

The second principle is that unexpected changes to the equilibrium have unexpected consequences, and the most difficult to predict are inflections in human value systems. For example, we once valued books not only for their information but as symbols of learning. Take a look next time you are visiting with an "educated" friend or even a professor. Where are the books? Not so much as once were common.

It is not just that so-called educated people don't own books, they do not read books or consider them important. This is especially common among today's students. Consider this as a precursor. The question is, "What does knowledge have to do with my success?" It's fine to say that this is nonsense, but is it?

These are the absurdities that appear just before major societal corrections. We once thought that family was critical to success. No so much anymore. Pedigree is not destiny.

There has been a slow but steady trend to devalue actual education. This may be the jolt to upset the institutional apple cart. If so, I doubt it was expected that 50% of $1.4T could head towards default in a catastrophe. But I do not see what there is to stop it either. Eventually, all such absurdities are eradicated from a functioning system as it changes modes.

The alternative view is that the value of the "education" is simply as a credential to gain employment in the government or corporate sector--that the value is in being socialized for the purposes of the government/corporate interests and not so much for knowledge. If we consider that corporations and government aligns with a feeling-type personality, then college is simply a feedback loop of resources for the indoctrination of the future corporate fodder.  Is this a cynical approach? Yes, but maybe just so. College education in the US is a paradox of absurdities with one constant--socialization.

If so, then systematic default in student loans would gladly be borne by the government without any reconfiguration of the "educational" enterprise. Failure will be subsidized if political conformity is achieved. In that sense, it it not failure per se.

Let's see.

The Shape of Things to Come

Some things are fairly well known. Let's start from those.

1. In the US, for the week of April 15, the average daily death toll will be a couple thousand coming mainly from the Northeast corridor.

2. Beginning in the week of April 21, if lockdowns persist, the unemployment rate will raise to over 15% and moderate size non-service oriented businesses will begin layoffs.

3. In the week of April 28, if the lockdown persists, the central government will no longer have enough credit to float the system, and businesses will follow their own pattern of adaptation.

Which means that within the next week, (the week of April 15), the central governments around the EU and North America have a decision to make:

A. Admit that the pandemic is out of control and instead prioritize the economy.

B. Double down into economic catastrophe.


My guess is that the governments will choose A. In that case, we have a very interesting social condition that will develop in that the free peoples will be divided amongst themselves on the basis of age. Going into the 2020 election, we will see that develop in political terms as well. I would expect that the Democrats will demagogue the issues and attempt to have it both ways before strongly siding with socialist-type interventions that are not economically feasible. The Republican, lacking strong leadership, will dance in the wind as they hope for the situation to resolve itself.

So by mid-May, we will have a new normal. The economy will be reopened but the virus will not be defeated. The daily death toll will remain in the thousands, but most people will begin to adapt to the threat, having learned effectively nothing. With a depressed economy and no excess capital to spend, certain changes will need to be made:

1. Higher education will cease to be a four-year vacation for the indolent on loans. The student loan system collapses under the weight of unpayable loans built on fraudulent education, bloated administrations, and a squirrel cage system of raising costs without value.

2. The financial system will be sacked of a great proportion of its liquidity.

3. The service sector will remain contracted, not for the virus, but because there is no money to spend.

4. Capital investments will contract and political solutions will be proposed that are in fact confiscations of wealth.

5. The legal system will lose legitimacy to the degree that court orders are not enforced by fiat, but rather only through negotiation.


Well, let's see.

Modeling the Coronavirus Contagion

Without a vaccine, the protection to at-risk populations is a matter of not getting the disease in the first place. So, the question of the pervasiveness of the spread of the disease is of greatest importance. The answer to this question depends almost entirely on the immunity of those infected and recovered since the US is not able to institute draconian isolation measures over any large geographical area.


While there was an initial indication that recovered individuals may be contagious, this is likely a test failure. Let us therefore assume that recovered individuals have immunity from reinfection and are not contagious for at least six months. If so, then the protection of at-risk individuals is feasible if they can be locally isolated when the wave of infections sweeps through an area. The recent success of the Chinese to stem the rate of spread of the disease should give us hope even though we do not weld doors shut on apartment complexes.


Remember, there is an approximately two-week lag time. So, when you see a bump up in the local rate of infection, act quickly and decisively to isolate your at-risk populations. Be prepared for 6-8 weeks of isolation per wave of infection. Meanwhile, on the national level, the best policy is to isolate the nation and quickly saturate with testing and isolate any affected occurrences. This disease is not super-human, but it is no slacker either.


A more detailed nonlinear control model will be forthcoming from the Prof. Ellina Grigorieva when data is available to estimate the parameters.



Good Luck.

Societal Evolution

Given the increasing division between the thinking/feeling poles in the modern integrated society, we can answer the question of how the system will evolve. Recall that in the Transnational Liberalism post, the system described had the thinking player at the exterior of an expanding universe. The feeling player is in the interior with the stability point being non-Pareto, i.e. it is somewhere within the interior between the two players. As the system grows fueled by technological advances, the periphery expands at a geometric rate and therefore the overall influence of the thinking player will outpace the that of the feeling player and the equilibrium point will tend to move towards the periphery. But this is the long term limit. The stable growth of the system can be upset as it is today by the rapid condensation of the interior as they tear from their connection to the exterior player.

Let's use the analogy of the system universe in a slightly different way. A system grows by its ability to direct useful information. The well-defined mores of a socio-political system are like the supporting structures of a tree that direct information (position) to the leaves. The feeling player gravitates to the points in the system which nurtures future generations, actively participates in the interpersonal relations of the culture, and forms the crony networks that dominate large organizations. While the exterior player creates wealth from work done with the environment, the function of the interior player is to create human value. But untethered power tends to corrupt and when the interior player does not see itself as dependent on the wealth creation process of the exterior player, the impression of dominance and self-sufficience may arise. At this context, the structures that were developed to support the productive activities of the exterior player may appear counterproductive to the interior player therefore leading to their corruption. This dynamic can lead to instability and collapse of the system.

As partisanship increases, the feeling player coalesces with the benefit of central position in being able to organize their efforts. Additionally, the feeling player has a simple common set of expressions, i.e. it is primitive in its motivations. Meanwhile, the exterior player is focused on the external environment. The exterior player typically goes about its business of working as a normal mode of operation while the interior player manipulates those with which its comes into contact as its method of extracting wealth. The exterior player experiences a lag in adapting to the initiatives of the interior player. This relationship will persist while the internal structures of the system supply information to the exterior player. If the information structures of the system are corrupted by the concentrated efforts of the interior player (it benefits from the ability to position itself against the exterior player using unrestricted interior lines), the efforts of the exterior player may collapse and it is forced to redirect its efforts into reestablishing the interior structures. This is now the present situation.

What follows is a chaotic interior struggle. The eventual winner is the exterior player due to their ability to communicate the creation of wealth and eventually, the interior structures will be rebuilt and the system reformed. Of course, the system will be the worse for this disruption and there is the chance of total system destruction should an exterior intervention such as nuclear war occur while the system is in its vulnerable state.

Societal Learning

It would be hard to miss the fact that these times seem a little strange. Nearly one-half of the population of the US appears to have politically lost their tether and are now openly indulging themselves in hysterical, fever-dreamed fits of rage.

This is societal learning. Learning is like the five stages of grief. It is a reaction and reconciliation with an external reality that throws one off of their balance. When society is composed of essentially two poles with fundamental learning differences, reality will hit both poles differently. The exterior player will adapt to the external influence while the interior player will fight the change before more slowly adapting. This is the model presented in the Transnational Liberalism post. The interior player are the DNC/Socialist party and the exterior player is the RNC/Conservative party. They are differentiated by the fundamental modes of feeling/thinking of their members.

The change is due to technology which has produced an integrated economy fused with politics as never before possible. The red-blue shift over the years has been accelerated by technology and has produced an economic and political dipole. Now, politics and economics are correspondent, ubiquitous, and omnipotent factors in determining nearly every other aspect of US life. As predicted in the TNL post, in such a situation, the interior player must eventually find themselves dependent and inferior to the exterior player since the exterior is where the ever expanding percentage of economic activity is sustained in a growing system. The recent adjustment of American conservative politics to populism and the concordant alignment of DNC/Socialist politics in opposition to populism is one aspect of the Trump phenomenon. This alignment is a mega-trend and not due to one individual.

Confronted with its decline as seen by a recent irrelevance in wish-fulfilling fantasies, the American left has gone from denial (the Russian hoax) to anger, and will soon enter the bargaining stage. Every election is a bargain or sorts, but this is a bargain to sustain an unrealistic internal state--the fantasy that the policies of the left are praiseworthy and not simply primitive selfish rationalizations.

What is clear at this point is that the next election will be one between pragmatism and open delusion. Learning will only take place if pragmatism wins out.

Evil by any other Name

When one decides to destroy what is innocent, to pervert what was righteous, or to subvert the truth, it is evil. This is not a matter of a misunderstanding, mistake, miscalculation, or misdemeanor---it is the fundamental crime of nature.

We see today the traces of certain evil. In the United States, the Democrat party as an institution openly supports infanticide and lies about it. In North Korea, a maniac supervises the murders of hundreds of thousands while he steadfastly builds the capability of murdering millions, but tries just as lamely to hide this fact. For us, to be naïve about this evil is not presently forgivable. The only acceptable moral choice is to act against the evil.

In the United States, that moral action is to destroy the Democrat party by all legitimate political means possible. In South-East Asia, the imperative is to destroy the Kim regime root and branch. They are both of the same evil nature and they both leave no other option.

Enough foolishness. This should have been clear before. Now it is clearly inescapable.

Afghanistan: What and Why

The problem of Afghanistan, from an American perspective, is the fact that it is a sinkhole for many of the evils of Islam in the Asian subcontinent in direct proximity to the dysfunctions of the bastardized nation-state of Pakistan. And Pakistan has the bomb---more than just a few now. Should that precarious government fall into the Islamic abyss, then those bombs would need to be recovered if at all possible. Otherwise, they would be used.

But a problem for which there is no solution is not a problem. As they say, it is merely a condition to be endured. That struggle which is present day Afghanistan does serve a purpose in stabilizing a greater system. As long as the central urban skeleton of Afghanistan continues independent of Taliban control, then Afghanistan acts as a killing field for the castaways of the slums of Quetta. The government of Pakistan avoids its most direct threat and no one is much the worse. To maintain this balance becomes just another cost of global prosperity. Since it is displaced upon America, you might say if you wish, that it is part and parcel of the "white man's burden".

But we believe that it needn't be so. We hope that we all might be better to our fellow man and that such suffering is not absolutely necessary. Is there a way from this quagmire to a place less odious?

In short, no. As long as there is Islam, there will be places such as Afghanistan. But by itself, Afghanistan would die a slow heat death as one generation of fighters grows old without greater conquest. To contain the Taliban's expansion is to bleed it to death. The Taliban is ultimately maintained by the throwaway wealth of the global jihad--by petrodollars of Riyadh.

Islam is a system that gives moral license to those who would take from others rather than to create. As a revelation-based theology, it is not possible to disprove its central tenets and to reform its masses. To cause a following for Islam, one must simply have a want to take rather than to create. There are many of such people in the slums of Quetta and the oil palaces of Riyadh. These are not people that grew to value an honest day's work and it is not within their culture to change that predisposition. The cause of that dysfunction is the excess of free wealth in Riyadh and the dearth of the apparatus of wealth in Quetta. This pipeline of misery flows both ways.

The positive evolution of Afghanistan is not unlike the ultimate evolution of Cuba. Once external funding is cut and the opium exports are eradicated, a slow process of reform will eventually overtake the country and drive out the death cult. It will take decades, not months.

Until then, the best we can do is to learn to value patience and discipline ourselves against acts of rash stupidity. We must continue to allow the derelicts of Quetta to learn the hard way as we demand that the princes of Riyadh learn the easy way. So far, we are now on the right track, but it would serve us to do away with the opium as we mind the palaces.

History and Destiny

If you can keep your head when all about you   

    Are losing theirs and blaming it on you,   

If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you,

    But make allowance for their doubting too;   

If you can wait and not be tired by waiting,

    Or being lied about, don’t deal in lies,

Or being hated, don’t give way to hating,

    And yet don’t look too good, nor talk too wise:

If you can dream—and not make dreams your master;   

    If you can think—and not make thoughts your aim;   

If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster

    And treat those two impostors just the same;   

If you can bear to hear the truth you’ve spoken

    Twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools,

Or watch the things you gave your life to, broken,

    And stoop and build ’em up with worn-out tools:

If you can make one heap of all your winnings

    And risk it on one turn of pitch-and-toss,

And lose, and start again at your beginnings

    And never breathe a word about your loss;

If you can force your heart and nerve and sinew

    To serve your turn long after they are gone,   

And so hold on when there is nothing in you

    Except the Will which says to them: ‘Hold on!’

If you can talk with crowds and keep your virtue,   

    Or walk with Kings—nor lose the common touch,

If neither foes nor loving friends can hurt you,

    If all men count with you, but none too much;

If you can fill the unforgiving minute

    With sixty seconds’ worth of distance run,   

Yours is the Earth and everything that’s in it,   

    And—which is more—you’ll be a Man, my son!

The DPRK Problem: Kabuki Theater

If countries acted like rational players, the US would have eliminated the DPRK nuclear program as soon as it became known and the ROK would have invaded and conquered the DPRK just as soon as it became evident the PRC would not be drawn into the conflict. All of this would have occurred approximately circa 1990.

But countries are not rational actors. Their leaders have domestic political considerations and the nation-state system itself has a short memory. Any initiative by the US and ROK to head off the emerging threat of North Korea would have come with immediate costs to the decision-makers that outweighed the expected benefits of rational action. And so they kicked the can down the street giving just enough cover to their actions so not to appear as craven as they were. The DPRK intelligently indulged the US/ROK in this kabuki theater.

From the DPRK position, it would be suicidal to over-respond to a proportionate action by the US/ROK. Any artillery attack against Seoul would be met with annihilation of the barraging force and of the regime, if not with total conventional conquest by the South. The North knows this, yet it maintains the threat because it serves its purpose in holding the US/ROK at bay. The real fear of the US/ROK is not retaliation by the North for a preemptive strike, it is the appearance that the political leader who initiated the action is accountable for the DPRK's response rather than Kim. Kim postures himself so as to escape rational consequence, but meanwhile, his actions are very deliberately designed to achieve his intermediate goal of separating the US from the ROK. His propaganda makes this clear.

Is there a way for the US/ROK leaders to deal with this complication while achieving the purpose of denuclearization? Yes, they could assassinate Kim.

The DPRK Problem: Intentions and Predictions

The DPRK problem is a system of interests, events, and consequences that is rationally being driven by Kim Jong-un, the dictator of the DPRK. His conception of purpose is the one that will drive the situation forward, barring unpredictable actions of other players. The ultimate goal of the DPRK is to establish hegemony over the entire Korean peninsula. In order to do this, the US must be separated from its ROK ally and then the ROK must be subjugated in a pseudo-cooperative process. Kim's pursuit of nuclear ICBMs/SLBMs is necessary and instrumental in the achievement of this purpose. However, at the same time he must deter the ROK from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons itself.

Kim cannot achieve these goals by war. However, the threat of war is his strongest card. He can only achieve his intermediate aims by direct negotiations with the US/ROK whereby they would agree to eject US forces from South Korea. Then he must develop a deterrent to US intervention so that the US will not come to the ROK's aid once he enters into the process of subjugation. For this, nuclear ICBMs/SLBMs are sufficient. As a rational actor, the US would not intervene to protect a non-treaty ally at the cost of millions of US lives.

Therefore, expect the DPRK to pursue a policy of bluff and deceit. Should it find itself in troubles, it will go to phony negotiations. The DPRK may even enlist other nations, such as Iran, to play a shell game during the process so that it maintains its capabilities while achieving its intermediate aims. Expect China to be permissive in this pursuit as it serves China's expansionist goals.

The best measure to take to foil this strategy is to assassinate Kim. North Korea has no motivation to attack or pursue nuclear weapons without Kim. The simple and humanitarian solution to the crisis is the well-deserved elimination of one tyrant.

The DPRK Problem: Capabilities and Costs

Without understanding the realm of possibilities, it is impossible to understand how the best options for the various players might be achieved. What are the individual capabilities of the DPRK, US, PRC, and ROK? In assessing these capabilities, very rough estimated are used.

1. The DPRK can have a SLBM capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the US within a year. They can have 10 ICBMs within the same time frame capable of  killing 2 million US persons and 4 million Japanese. The DPRK can presently kill 2 million ROK civilians with nuclear means and 500,000 in an extended general war by non-nuclear means.

Within a year, the DPRK can cause 2 trillion USD loss to the world economy evenly distributed between the PRC, US, Japan, and ROK.

As long as Kim is alive, the full extent of these losses is realizable. If Kim was killed, the maximum losses are cut to a fraction since the DPRK would not likely face total annihilation in order to inflict these loses.

2. The US has the capability of full spectrum operations against the DPRK but can only attrite the DPRK military forces to 50% over the period of a year using conventional weapons and over a week using nuclear weapons. Kim can be assassinated given one week's notice.

3. The ROK can defeat the DPRK using military operations over the period of a year and can assassinate Kim with one month's notice.

4. The PRC can assassinate Kim with one month's notice.

We often qualify capabilities by thinking about intents and costs at the same time. However, since nuclear capabilities are the result of the coherent efforts of a nation-state and since the decision for their application is consequentialist and contextual, it is best to strictly separate these ideas in the analysis.

Now let's look at the costs for the players' actualization of their capabilities.

1. Should the DPRK initiate a general war, it will be destroyed as an entity and Kim along with it. The Kim project of creating a "socialist paradise" which has proved itself a lie over the years would be forever put out of its misery. Kim would have the same egotistical accomplishment as Hitler in his bunker as he spent the capitol of Germany into the flames of Russian fires. He will have the accomplishment of adding another million deaths to his funeral pyre.

This cost should be seen on balance as simply the punctuation at the end of a sentence. Overall, it is a wash except for the opportunity cost of what might have been achieved with more time.

Should the DPRK instigate anything less than general war, the expectation from its perspective is that it would have nothing but profit while undertaking a temporary heroic risk. The cost of each provocative action is weighed against the possibility of something greater if another course is taken. The DPRK does not see costs in these actions other than the economic cost of retribution by the PRC.

2. The cost of a general war to the PRC would be the temporary influx of perhaps a million refugees weighed against the renumeration by what remains of Korea for the PRC's costs. The PRC would lose a prod to use against the US, but would over time gain a subservient trading partner just as Eastern Europe is a trading partner of Russia.

Should the war go nuclear, there is the increasing cost of fallout on Chinese soil. China would take affirmative actions to suppress this threat. For this reason alone it is highly unlikely that the DPRK would respond to pinprick attacks with nuclear weapons.

3. Given a general war using nuclear weapons, the ROK would suffer horrendous loss, but would survive to rebuild. In a year, with more nuclear weapons in the hands of the DPRK, it is not clear that this is possible.

4. The US would suffer minor direct loss from a general war in Korea but potentially huge international losses if that war was not universally seen as the responsibility of the DPRK. This cost would be proportionate to the ability of the US to safeguard the ROK population.

Considering the ratio of costs to capabilities, it is clearly necessary for the US to engage the PRC to bring about the end of Kim personally and of his regime in general. Should the PRC show that it can or will not achieve this aim, then it is incumbent on the ROK to pursue assassination. Should the ROK balk at this, then it is necessary for the US to assassinate Kim and his weapons program together with the artillery emplacements in the Pyongsan vicinity and to occupy that area. This will cost the US about 5000 casualties since the operation must be accomplished quickly using conventional arms alone. It is expected that the brunt of the fighting would be done by ROK troops.

After the imminent threat by the DPRK to use nuclear weapons, the US would use tactical nuclear weapons, if advisable, to overcome the DPRK offensive capabilities. A stalemate along this protective border could be achieved within two weeks at the cost of the same losses that the US experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan during the most intense two years of fighting.

The DPRK Problem: Decision-making

While we are distracted by the events of the day: a missile launch, a political statement, or a foreign visit, there are a couple of more important decisions that have been made that will define the course of events yet to come. The first is the decision by the ROK to retain the THAAD system. The second is the decision by the DPRK not to initiate the sixth nuclear test.

Each of these decisions are perceived by their makers to be critical to the evolution of events in the future by the other players, notably the US and PRC. The fact that they have not been made by this point indicates that a positive decision has been made not to make them. And from that we can infer the position of two of the major players of this drama: the ROK and DPRK.

Ahead of the Presidential elections in the ROK, President Trump issued a statement that South Korea should pay approximately $1B USD for the THAAD system. This statement was quickly withdrawn. Nonetheless, the THAAD system remains in the ROK, operational. Should the ROK have the system removed, it would of course be folly. However, by not removing THAAD the ROK links itself to the decisions of the US which do threaten to create hostilities with the DPRK in order to set back the DPRK nuclear and missile programs and/or destabilize the North Korean regime.

So the ROK is under a primary threat of nuclear attack by not subjugating itself politically to North Korea. Of course, this is North Korea's primary purpose in developing nuclear ICBMs that can possibly drive a wedge between the US and the ROK. During the Cold War, France faced a similar decision and decided to develop its own nuclear deterrent and only then drop out of NATO. The thought the French had was that the Russians would be content to invade just West Germany. Soviet warplans discovered in their archive showed this cowardly betrayal to be mistaken. France would be invaded regardless.  Both the ROK and the US face a similar decision today. Either can attempt to cut and run. For the time being, both are allowing themselves to be backed into a common fight. The immediate cost may be enormous and the long term cost of appeasement, even higher.

On the other hand, the DPRK has forestalled its previously scheduled sixth nuclear test. This test would have likely have been a bridge too far for Sino-North Korean relations under pressure from the US. And it may have triggered an immediate US preemptive strike against the DPRK nuclear and missile facilities. By putting this test on hold, the Kim regime shows weakness which may lead those within the regime to doubt its wherewithal. To shore this confidence up, the DPRK has conducted two additional missile tests which also have the benefit of moving its ICBM program ahead. There is simultaneous work to advance the SLBM program. Both programs are aimed at Japan and the US.

The DPRK's decision to delay the sixth test validates the fact that the PRC has sufficient control over the DPRK's future that the DPRK believes it must acquiesce to Chinese demands.  Ninety percent of North Korea trade is with the PRC. The DPRK is not nearly as self-sufficient as it would have its people believe especially in terms of fuel, food, and the luxury items that are paid as bribes to Kim's various cronies that help him control the country. Should North Korea conduct the sixth test, it would likely signal to the US that the PRC cannot or will not control North Korea. This would greatly diminish China's role in any resolution of the DPRK problem and increase the likelihood of US preemptive action.

Both decisions show that it is the United States' game to lose. The US loses by backing down or by excessive delay in forcing the elimination of the DPRK's ability to deliver nuclear weapons.

The DPRK Problem: What is it? How to solve it?

Due to the fact that technology advances in a closed system just as entropy increases, we are confronted with the problem that the DPRK will soon be able to launch nuclear SLBMs/ICBMs capable of destroying cities on the US mainland. This is a problem since MAD does not work with an asymmetric partner such as North Korea. One must have something significant to lose and the player must be restricted to rational outcomes for MAD to be possible as a deterrent. Although Kim himself is rational, his regime is not. What does Kim care if North Korea is reduced to ashes as long as his ego is satisfied? Thus, there is effectively no control mechanism to fall back on once the DPRK achieves this milestone.

The DPRK is not unique in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Nearly every totalitarian state with either a sufficient technological base or cash flow has attempted to acquire nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them widely: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nazi Germany, Cuba as a proxy of the Soviet Union, Mao's China, Stalin's Russia, etc. The attainment of nuclear weapons is the magical brass ring that totalitarian states are drawn to by their very nature. It is the logical culmination of the unbridled pursuit of power and control. And then war. Inevitably the pursuit of power is turned outwards once internal domination is complete.

Fortunately, these states are generally slow to develop the advanced technology that enables the nuclear and missile programs since the centralization of control makes for bad economics. Also the lack of freedom inhibits technological risk-taking.  But over time, if left to their own devices, the technology will develop. So any long-term solution to the DPRK nuclear problem cannot be achieved without the destruction of the DPRK totalitarian state apparatus.

As a matter of necessity, the DPRK must be catastrophically destabilized. This can be achieved by assassination, war, or sanctions that would make the "Arduous March" look like a three year feast. In other words, sanctions by themselves are a delaying effort that will not work. That leaves assassination or war. Of these two, assassination of the dictator is by far the most humane and reasonable action. The regime is held together by a cult of personality based in Confucian traditions, not so much the failed ideology of socialism. Even North Koreans are aware that their economic conditions are not nearly as good as that of the South. Assassination is not only preferable, it is necessary.

But don't expect that killing Kim Jong-un will achieve the best outcome by itself. Political influence applied towards the devolution of the totalitarian state is still necessary. The heir apparent to the hereditary regime might be instrumental towards this aim, but cold hard deterrence and subversion of the state itself is required to avoid a general war. In the event of the demise of the dictator, there should be a widespread belief that avoidance of war is in the best interest of the people.

Ideally, the assassination would appear natural and without the fingerprints of any particular actor. Fortunately, these totalitarian regimes often point directly to what they fear the most. Kim fears "nano poisonous" delayed-action agents.

Indeed he should. It is the rational thing to fear.